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Abstract 
 
Experiments measuring risk and time preferences in developing countries have tended 
to have relatively small samples and geographically concentrated sampling. This large-
scale field experiment uses a Holt-Laury mechanism to elicit the preferences of 1289 
randomly selected subjects from 94 villages covering six out of seven agro-climatic 
zones across rural Uganda. As in previous studies we find evidence of risk aversion and 
loss aversion amongst most subjects. In addition we find significant heterogeneity in 
risk attitudes across agro-climatic zones. Especially, the farmers in the agro-climatically 
least favourable zone, the uni-modal rainfall zone, are the most risk averse, loss averse 
and impatient. We also find significant relationships between risk attitudes and village 
level predictors such as the distance to town and the road conditions. After controlling 
for the village level factors, we find that the level of schooling still positively correlates 
with the individual’s level of loss tolerance and patience. The main results are not 
altered by allowing for probability weighting in subjects’ choices. Overall the results 
provide clear evidence that within one country there may be significant regional 
variations in risk and time attitudes. We conjecture that the agro-climatic conditions that 
affect farmers’ livelihoods may also affect their risk and time preferences and village 
level development in infrastructure could improve the household perception of 
investment related policies. 
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REGIONAL VARIATION IN RISK AND TIME PREFERENCES: EVIDENCE 
FROM A LARGE-SCALE FIELD EXPERIMENT IN RURAL UGANDA 
 
1. Introduction 
In a developing country, where formal financial services are still scarce, risk aversion 
and high discount rates remain possible obstacles to private investment in physical and 
human capital resulting in slow economic advancement (World Bank, 2008). While 
various external factors such as market conditions and quality of schools may affect 
household demand for investment, behavioural studies have pointed out that a better 
understanding of the risk and time preferences of rural households can provide insight 
into investment decisions (Yesuf, 2009; Bauer and Chytilová, 2010; Tanaka et al., 
2010). Considering the different types and degree of uncertainties faced by rural 
households in different geographical regions, farmers’ attitudes towards such risks or 
time preferences could also vary across the regions. 
Risk attitudes and discount rates are not merely reflection of personal 
preferences but represent economic and other conditions of the individuals and 
households. For instance, in a Ugandan study, Bauer and Chytilová (2010) find a causal 
relationship between adult educational attainment and individual discount rates. In a 
broader context, risk and time preferences may also result from factors affecting 
villages and geographical regions in which the farmers live. At the macro level, 
countries with tropical climate have been found to experience slower economic growth 
than those with more temperate climate (Sachs and Warner, 1997). At the micro level, 
household studies find that in less favourable agro-climatic zones, farmers experience 
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lower level and/or higher variability of crop yields than those in more favourable zones, 
resulting in different risk-coping strategies across zones (Reardon and Taylor, 1996; 
Skees et al, 2001; Pender et al., 2004). While disadvantages in climatic conditions may 
be overcome by appropriate policies (Collier and Gunning, 1999), higher variability in 
agricultural production due to the exogenous factors may still lead to higher risk 
aversion or discount rate hindering efficient investment by farmers.  
Despite the potentially important insight to be gained from analysing the 
regional variation in risk and time preferences, previous experimental studies have 
lacked such analyses due to limited sample sizes and geographical variation 
(Binswanger, 1980; Wik et al., 2004; Kirby et al., 2002; Yesuf, 2009; Harrison et al., 
2010; Tanaka et al., 2010; Bauer and Chytilová, 2010).  
 This study, therefore, makes a unique contribution in that it covers almost the 
whole country geographically and six out of seven of its agro-climatic zones. Our large-
scale field experiment uses a Holt and Laury (2002) mechanism to elicit the preferences 
of 1289 randomly selected subjects from 94 villages in the central, eastern and western 
regions of Uganda. Thus, it is the only paper to date from a developing country that can 
examine seriously issues of geographical variation.1 If the variation in risky attitudes is 
found to be significant, this in turn implies that policies to induce household investment 
may require regional adjustment. 
 Our main result is that there is heterogeneity in preferences across agro-climatic 
zones possibly due to different types of crops produced in those areas. There are also 
other significant village level predictors such as the distances to town and the road 
                                                     
1 In a developed country context, Harrison et al, 2002, map preferences across Denmark, though their 
focus is not on geographical variation.  
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conditions. At the same time, after controlling for the regional and village-level factors, 
the individual level of education positively correlates with more patience and loss 
tolerance. 
 Any regional variation in measured risk attitudes, however, may be due to 
variation in background risk, variation in preference or even variations in risk and 
experience that have moulded preferences (Dercon, 2008; Ogden et al., 2004; 
Humphrey and Verschoor, 2004). Our data does not allow us to determine whether the 
measured risk attitudes represent preference or background risk (Gollier and Pratt, 
1996). Decomposing the factors affecting the variation of the measured risk attitudes 
requires further research. Nonetheless, we have ruled out some obvious preference 
variables such as ethnicity and our main results are not altered by allowing for 
probability weighting in subjects’ choices. Existing external data on agro-climatic 
conditions in Uganda does not show clear evidence of variations in background risk at 
the regional level.  
 In the next section, we discuss the conceptual framework on how the village 
characteristics affect the individual risk and time preferences. Section 3 presents the 
data, experimental design and estimation methodology.  The results are presented in 
Section 4, followed by discussion in Section 5 and Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1    Village Characteristics and Preferences 
 The World Bank (2008) reports that weather related shocks are one of the 
biggest risks farmers face, and without adequate insurance or credit mechanism, it may 
take a long time for the rural households to recover from losses in times of crisis. In the 
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specific context of Uganda, the drought that especially hit the north-western region in 
March 2011 is the latest of the many recurrent droughts that have shortened the crop 
season, resulting in unstable farm income for farmers (EM-DAT, 2011). Pests and 
diseases also affect coffee production in various parts of Uganda (New Vision, April 5th 
2010).  Anticipating such shocks, farmers may be unwilling to invest their assets in new 
technology or schooling for their children since their future is highly uncertain and the 
commitment is long-term. Dercon (2008) points out that risk fundamental matters for 
behaviour because of such constraints as insurance market failure. People with fewer 
insurance options may also be those living further away from urban centres, where 
insurance and financial service agents are usually located. Subsequently, those having 
less access to such financial services may exhibit stronger aversion to risk, but this 
behaviour is not necessarily due to their preferences. 
 There may be other regional factors such as agricultural potential of the areas in 
which their farms are located that affect the observed risk attitudes and discount rates of 
the farmers. Reardon and Taylor (1996) in their study in Burkina Faso analyse the 
relationship between agro-ecological zones and poverty, and find that in the face of 
drought, the least favourable agro-ecological zone, where the rainfall is most erratic and 
the environmental degradation is most pronounced, experienced the highest increase in 
poverty. They further find that the poor households in the affected regions dispose of 
livestock possibly due to the lack of other income smoothing options, increasing the 
vulnerability of the poor farmers. Skees et al (2001) in Morocco also reports that the 
variation in cereal yield is mostly found in less favourable agro-climatic zones. Since 
rainfall patterns vary across agro-climatic zones, they suggest that weather insurance 
should be designed in such a way that account for the differences across the zones. 
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 In rural Uganda, too, Pender et al. (2004) finds that observed development 
pathways in the 1990s differ across agro-climatic zones as mapped in Figure 1. Seven 
agro-climatic zones have been identified according to the agro-climatic potential based 
on rainfall pattern (bi-modal or uni-modal), lengths of growing period (LGP) and 
altitude: the high potential bi-modal rainfall zone (10-12 months LGP - mostly the Lake 
Victoria crescent), the medium potential bi-modal rainfall zone (8–9 months LGP – 
most of central and parts of western Uganda), the low potential bi-modal rainfall zone 
(6–7 months LGP - lower elevation parts of south-western Uganda), the high potential 
bi-modal rainfall south-western highlands (1500 metres above sea level and above), the 
high potential uni-modal rainfall eastern highlands (1500 metres above sea level and 
above), the medium potential uni-modal rainfall zone (6–7 months LGP–parts of 
northern and eastern Uganda), and the low potential uni-modal rainfall zone (less than 
six months LGP – much of north-eastern Uganda).  They find, for instance, increased 
banana and coffee production to be the most common development pathway in the low 
and high potential bi-modal rainfall zones, while increased cereal production is most 
common in the medium potential bi-modal rainfall zone. While the former development 
results in positive outcomes such as better child nutrition and quality of drinking water, 
the latter results in not only better child nutrition, but also lower availability of energy 
sources (Pender et al., 2004). Another finding from a related work is that households in 
the uni-modal zone, with less rainfall than most other zones, are not necessarily poorer 
than households from other zones (Nkonya et al., 2004). Lower farm income is 
complemented by non-farm income where such activities are available and households 
have the necessary human and physical resources. 
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 Agro-climatic conditions that thus affect the behaviour of farmers could also 
affect the farmers’ risk and time preferences. For example, the experience of erratic 
rainfall or living in a uni-modal zone may result in less pro-investment preferences. 
Fearing high variability in farm income due to drought or shorter crop season, farmers 
in the less favourable areas may exhibit stronger impatience or aversion to risks than 
those in the more favourable areas. Alternatively, the relatively low level of welfare due 
to the unfavourable condition may result in higher risk aversion or higher discounting.  
 Other village level factors that may affect risk and time preference are 
population density, distance to towns and availability of local schools. First, Uganda’s 
population growth rate is 3.1 per cent per annum and its decline is far slower than many 
other developing countries (Bremner et al., 2010). In a populous area, arable farm land 
per capita may be small and farmers may be less willing to take on risks on the types of 
crop to produce. Alternatively, a highly populous region may imply more cash income 
opportunities from non-farm activities such as taxi-driver or trading, resulting in less 
aversion to income risks. Second, shorter distance to urban centres and better road 
conditions generally increase farm income due to lower transport cost as witnessed 
among Kenyan farmers by Yamano and Kijima (2010). Proximity to town implies not 
only better access to financial services but also better access to assistance from local 
governments and non-governmental organisations in times of crisis, resulting in 
possibly more tolerant attitudes towards risks. Last, educational opportunity may affect 
farmers’ preference. Bauer and Chytilová (2010) study uses the number of local schools 
as an instrumental variable for educational attainment, and find that the higher the 
educational attainment, the lower the discount rate. A possibility remains that the 
availability of schools in itself influences the risk and time preferences of the villagers. 
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With the knowledge that a local educational facility exists, one may be induced to 
exercise more patience in such endeavour as planning for children’s schooling. There 
may also be externality through more educated villagers, such as school teachers, that 
may help transfer knowledge and information to other villagers. Information is crucial 
in making accurate investment decisions and may also reduce excessive aversion to 
risks (Humphrey and Verschoor, 2004).  
 One complexity in the analysis of correlation between environmental factors and 
farmers’ preferences is the notion of ‘background risk’. In the field experiment, 
individuals participate in a lottery game that involves risks that we may call ‘foreground 
risk’. Gollier and Pratt (1996) establish theoretically that for the class of utility 
functions exhibiting decreasing absolute risk aversion, an addition of unfair 
‘background risk’, such as variable current income, makes the individual more risk 
averse  in such an independent risk experiment.2 If farmers from certain agro-climatic 
zones exhibit higher risk aversion, for example, it may be due to differences in pure 
taste or differences in ‘background risks’ or both. Noting the ‘risk vulnerability’ of our 
measurement, the investigation into the relationship between preferences and the 
regional factors becomes even more important to investment policies in that it could 
reveal the potential role of ‘background  risks’ in different regions in shaping the 
farmers’ preferences. 
 Despite the potential insight gained from analysing the relationship between the 
risk/time preferences and the village level factors, no past study has done such an 
analysis probably due to the absence of the measurement of the preferences on a large 
                                                     
2 Constant relative risk aversion utility function that we use in our experiment is also in this class. 
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scale with geographical and regional variation. Insurance or credit take-up data that can 
be used to compute risk and time preferences are rare in low-income countries, 
especially in rural areas. Even when they are available, evidence from past studies show 
that, for example, the market interest rates are not necessarily the same as the 
individual’s revealed discount rate (Coller and Williams, 1999). Therefore, incentivized 
experiments have become the norm to elicit the preferences, but such experiments are 
costly and require more controlled setting and designing than a survey (Holt and Laury, 
2002; Carpenter et al., 2005). As a result, past empirical evidence from low-income 
countries has been based on a relatively small sample size with limited geographical 
variation: for example, 240 farmers in semi-arid tropical areas of India, 181 individuals 
in 9 villages from Southern and Northern Vietnam, 262 farming households in the State 
of Amhara, Ethiopia, 110 households in Northern Zambia and 205 farmers from two 
villages in East Uganda (Binswanger, 1981; Tanaka et al., 2010; Yesuf, 2009; Wik et al., 
2004; Humphrey and Verschoor, 2004; respectively). Bauer and Chytilová (2010) 
experiment on discount rates was large in scale, but geographically limited to 10 
villages in a single district in southern Uganda. 
 In addition, existing evidence on the determinants of preferences have been 
mixed. While some studies find a positive correlation between household wealth and 
risk aversion, others find a negative correlation (Yesuf, 2009; Wik et al., 2004; 
Binswanger, 1980). Schooling is generally associated with more patience, but the 
correlation between education and risk attitude is less clear (Bauer and Chytilová, 2010; 
Wik et al., 2004; Kirby et al., 2002; Tanaka et al., 2010; Binswanger, 1980). A possible 
reason for insignificant or mixed results is that variations in income or education of 
individuals and households are limited due to sample size. Such variation may also 
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depend on the village level characteristics. In fact, Tanaka et al. (2010) find that while 
the household income does not correlate with the farmers’ risk aversion, the mean 
village income does. Could it be that conflicting results from past studies arise partly 
due to broader economic conditions that surround the subjects such as climates and 
other village characteristics? 
 In this paper, we analyse the village characteristics that may be correlating with 
farmers’ risk aversion and subjective discount rates. By doing so, we identify certain 
aspects of the farmers’ environment that may be hindering their potential investment 
activities. 
 
2.2   Framework on Measuring Risk and Time Preferences 
Risk Aversion 
The expected utility theory (EUT) states that a rational individual maximizes the 
expected utility of final wealth or ∑ ݌௜ݑሺ ௜ܹሻ௡௜ୀଵ , where ݑሺ ௜ܹሻ is the level of utility 
derived from the final wealth 	 ௜ܹ  which occurs with probability ݌௜  for each of the ݊  
possible states. When the utility function is concave, the individual is said to be risk-
averse, preferring a sure income of 	 ௜ܹ  to a fair gamble with expected value of	 ௜ܹ . 
Using the Arrow-Pratt measure of risk aversion, ݎሺܹሻ ൌ െݑ′′ሺܹሻ ݑ′ሺܹሻ⁄ , the risk-
averse individual is represented by ݎሺܹሻ ൐ 0, the risk preferring individual by ݎሺܹሻ ൏
0and the risk neutral individuals by ݎሺܹሻ ൌ 0. In risk experiments, the relative risk 
aversion parameter,rሺܯሻ ൌ െܯ ∗ ݑ′′ሺܯሻ ݑ′ሺܯሻ⁄ , is often estimated to represent the 
degree of risk aversion, where ܯ is the change in wealth offered in the experiment 
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instead of the final wealth (Holt and Laury, 2002).3 Assuming a constant relative risk 
aversion (CRRA) utility function, ݑሺܯሻ ൌ ெభష഑ଵିఙ , where ߪ indicates the curvature of the 
utility function, ݎሺܯሻ ൌ ߪ.4  
 In order to estimate the risk aversion parameter, ߪ, the risk experiment often 
takes the form of pair-wise choices or choices from a list of lotteries with varying 
probabilities ݌௜ and payoffs ܯ௜ (Holt and Laury, 2002). The degree of risk aversion ߪ is 
computed by equating two lotteries that give the same level of expected utility 
∑ ݌௜ ெ೔
భష഑
ଵିఙ
௡௜ୀଵ  to the individual. Assuming EUT to be true, previous experimental studies 
have found individuals to be, on average, risk-averse (Binswanger, 1980; Wik and 
Holden, 1998 as cited in Cardenas and Carpenter, 2008; Yesuf, 2004). The estimated 
risk aversion coefficient ranged from between 0.68 and 0.97 in the USA, to 0.71 in 
India, and to between 0.81 and 2.0 in Zambia (Holt and Laury, 2002, Binswanger, 1980, 
and Wik and Holden, 1998 as cited in Cardenas and Carpenter, 2008). The significance 
of these findings was that, under the controlled experimental setting, the degrees of risk 
aversions as represented by the coefficients were not so different between the subjects in 
developed and developing countries. 
 
Loss Aversion  
Besides risk aversion, loss aversion is also potentially an important aspect of risk 
                                                     
3 The rationale for measuring the risk aversion in terms of the change in wealth rather than the final 
wealth is that under the experimental setting, we are trying to measure the individual reaction to varying 
degrees of prospects given the wealth level. The psychology literature has usually followed this method 
as well (Binswanger, 1981). 
4 Another risk aversion coefficient typically used in the risk experiment is the Constant Partial Risk 
Aversion (CPRA) parameter with utility function, ݑሺܯሻ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߪሻܯଵିఙ   where ܯ  is the certainty 
equivalence of the (Binswanger, 1980; Yesuf, 2009). Assuming zero initial wealth, CRRA is equal to the 
CPRA parameter (Binswanger, 1981).  
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attitude among rural households in developing countries. Loss aversion is the concept 
from prospect theory (PT), the alternative theory to EUT, which states that a prospect of 
a loss tends to loom larger than that of a gain of the same magnitude, i.e. uሺMሻ ൏
െuሺെMሻ (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Loss aversion has also been elicited using 
lottery games, but including negative amounts in some choices. Subjects typically chose 
relatively safer options when facing possible losses than in the gains-only games (Wik 
et al., 2004; Yesuf, 2009). For instance, for the same expected gain, the proportion of 
subjects preferring the sure income to the gamble doubled when the lower payoff in the 
gamble changed from a positive amount to a negative amount (Yesuf, 2009).5  
The degree of loss aversion has also been estimated, using the value functions, 
uሺMሻ ൌ ܯఙ for gains M ൐ 0  and uሺMሻ ൌ െλሺെMሻఙ  for losses 	M ൏ 0  where λ is the 
loss aversion parameter. Tanaka et al. (2010) estimated the average loss aversion of 
Vietnamese subjects to be 2.63, close to the 2.25 estimated by Tversky and Kahneman 
(1992) for US university students. This suggests that the degrees of loss aversion are 
similar in developing and developed countries. Nonetheless, the regression analysis by 
Tanaka et al. (2010) revealed, within the Vietnamese sample, the loss aversion strongly 
correlated with lower village income (Tanaka et al., 2010).  
 
Subjective Discount Rates  
The subjective discount rate is the rate at which individuals substitute future 
consumption with today’s consumption. In an experimental setting, it is measured by 
                                                     
5 The first game was choosing between a sure income of 10 Birrs and a lottery with a 50-50 chance of 
winning 9 or 18 Birrs. The second game was choosing between a sure income of 0 Birrs and a lottery with 
a 50-50 chance of winning -1 or 8 Birrs. The risky options in both games have expected value of 3.5 Birrs 
higher than the sure income. 
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comparing the pair-wise choice of money at two different times. In past field 
experiments with real payoffs, the elicited annual discount rates have been: on average 
28 per cent in Denmark (Harrison, Lau and Williams, 2002); and at the median, 43 per 
cent in highland Ethiopia (Yesuf, 2004); at the median, 30-60 per cent in India 
depending on the given time frame (Penders, 1996 as cited in Yesuf, 2004). 
 Present bias is the notion that the utility from the present consumption is 
weighted especially higher than the utilities derived from consumptions at future dates.6 
This notion of procrastination is also found by Duflo et al. (2009) in an agricultural 
experiment in Kenya, where farmers failed to adopt fertilizer not so much due to 
impatience but to present bias. In Vietnam, Tanaka et al. (2010) found that, estimating 
under a quasi-hyperbolic discounting function, their sample households in Vietnam 
weighted the utility from future earnings 0.64 less than the utility from the present 
earning.7 Identification of such present bias helps us not only to accurately measure the 
discount rates, but also to find alternative policy measures.8 
 The second issue is the correlation between risk aversion and discount rates.  
When considering choices between a certain income today and an uncertain income at a 
future date, it is reasonable to assume that the decision is affected not only by time 
preferences but also by the risk attitude of the individual towards an uncertain future. 
Andersen et al. (2008), in their study in Denmark, estimate that the difference in the 
                                                     
6 There is also a discussion on the concept of hyperbolic discounting, which is that an individual’s 
discount rate varies with the time horizon: the closer the timing of the payment to today, the higher the 
discounting. However, in empirical studies, the hyperbolic shape is often found not to be statistically 
significant (Coller, Harrison and Rutström, 2003; Tanaka et al, 2010). Rather, it is the existence of present 
bias that affected the shape of the discounting function. 
7 The quasi-hyperbolic discounting function used is ݑሺݕሻ ൌ ݕߚ݁ି௥௧    where ݕ is the reward, ߚ  is the 
present-bias and ݎ is the discount rate at time ݐ. 
8  Duflo et al. (2009), for example, suggest that a small timely subsidy can potentially increase the 
adoption of fertilizers among present-biased farmers, instead of having to provide heavy subsidies 
assuming high discount rates. 
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subjective discount rates assuming risk neutrality and moderate risk aversion is around 
15 percentages points. In Ethiopia, too, more risk-averse subjects revealed higher 
discount rates (Yesuf, 2004). In developing countries, where the degree of risks and 
their impacts on people’s attitudes are likely to be higher than in developed countries, it 
may be of even greater importance to take into account the risk attitudes in estimating 
discount rates. 
  
2.3   Hypothesis 
Our main research purpose is to estimate the risk and time preferences of rural 
Ugandans and investigate whether they correlate with any of the village level 
characteristics. In estimating the risk aversion, the loss aversion and the discount rates 
of the rural Ugandan farmers, we expect to find highest risk/loss aversion and lowest 
patience among individuals located in the least favourable zone, namely the uni-modal 
zone. We also expect that the shorter the distance to town and the better the condition of 
the main road to town, the less risk/loss aversion or the more patience. While population 
density may affect the preferences positively or negatively, the number of schools in the 
village is expected to increase patience or risk/loss tolerance. 
 
3.  Data and experimental design and estimation method 
3.1 Data 
The data is collected in rural Uganda as part of a nation-wide project, Research 
on Poverty, Environment and Agricultural Technology (RePEAT).9 Figure 1 shows the 
                                                     
9 RePEAT is a joint study by Makerere University (Uganda), Foundation for Advanced Studies on 
International Development (Japan) and National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (Japan). 
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selected villages where the experiment took part. Following an earlier study on land 
management in Uganda (Pender et al., 2004) that is introduced in section 2, the villages 
(or Local Council 1, the lowest administrative unit in Uganda) were selected from a 
stratified random sample across six agro-climatic zones: the high potential bi-modal 
rainfall zone, the medium potential bi-modal rainfall zone, the low potential bi-modal 
rainfall zone, the uni-modal rainfall zone, the south-western highlands and the eastern 
highlands (Yamano et al., 2004). 10  Thus, our sample is not only large but also 
geographically representative of rural Uganda except for the northern region. The 
survey data had been collected from around 940 households in 94 villages in the three 
rounds of survey in 2003, 2005 and 2009. Because of the security concerns, the northern 
and north eastern parts of the country were excluded from the sampling. The risk and 
time preference experiments were then carried out in March 2009 targeting the same 
households and their neighbours.  
The total number of respondents in the experiments is 1289 among which 787 
are panel subjects for which we have household data for regression analysis. The sample 
statistics are shown in Table 1. The attrition rate between 2005 and 2009 for the panel 
subjects was 16.3 per cent. 11  The household characteristics of those subjects that 
participated in the experiments are not statistically significantly different from those that 
did not according to t-tests (Table 1), implying the representativeness of our sample still 
holds. The average household size of the respondent is 7.7 members. The mean 
dependency ratio, the ratio of the number of adults to that of children, is 1.2. Per capita 
                                                     
10 These zones correspond to the seven zones of Pender et al. (2004) introduced in section 2, except for 
the “uni-modal rainfall” zone which combines the low and medium potential uni-modal rainfall zones by 
Pender et al. (2004) which the original authors note to have relatively similar agricultural potentials.  
11  (=[940-787]/940) 
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income and the asset value of the respondents’ household are on average 152.7 US 
dollars (USD) and 207.2 USD respectively.12 Around 68 per cent of all the respondents 
are male with an average age of 45 years. While 66 per cent of them are literate, the 
average years of schooling is 5.7. 
Table 2 shows the characteristics of the sampled villages. The average farm size 
is larger in the bi-modal rainfall zones than in other zones, but the trend does not 
necessarily translate to the differences in average per capita expenditure. The uni-modal 
zone has lower agricultural potential with shortest growing period, but the average 
wealth is similar to that in the high potential bi-modal rainfall zone with the same 
average land size. These statistics are consistent with the previous study in Uganda 
(Nkonya et al., 2004). In terms of crop production, while staple food crops such as 
maize and matooke are grown by the majority of households in any agro-climatic zone, 
other crops such as coffee, sweet potato and rice have more regional variation. The 
average distance to district town and the road condition for the road to district town are 
also different across region. In the low potential bi-modal rainfall zone, the distance to 
town is furthest, but the proportion of villages with all season tarmac road for the road 
to district town is the highest; in contrast, in the uni-modal rainfall zone, the average 
distance is shortest but in 75 per cent of the villages, the road condition is all season dirt. 
The effects of the distance to the town and the road conditions on the risk and time 
preferences may need to be analysed together. In terms of the population density, the 
high potential bi-modal rainfall zone is most populous, followed by the uni-modal 
rainfall zone.  The number of primary and secondary schools seems to correlate with 
                                                     
12 The exchange rate used is 1730 Ugandan Shillings to 1 USD.  Using the purchasing power parity 
conversion factor of 744.618, the average per capita income and the total asset value are 354.8 and 481.4 
respectively. (source: www.unstat.un.org) 
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population density: the more the people, the more schools there are. No single agro-
climatic zone has extreme village characteristics in all of the above factors. In order to 
estimate the correlation between these characteristics and the preferences, we use the 
methodology as explained in the next section. 
 
3.2 Experimental Design 
The experimental design follows that of the pair-wise choice framework (Holt 
and Laury, 2002; Tanaka et al., 2010). We played eight games in total. The options 
within the four risk games and four time preference games are presented in Appendix 
Tables 1 and 2. Incentives were given for the risk games in order to elicit the subjects’ 
true preferences (Holt and Laury, 2002). Thus, the respondents were told before the 
games begin that one of the risk games would be played for real and they would be paid 
cash according to their answers in the game. In all eight games, subjects were asked to 
choose between Column A and Column B. In the risk games 1, 2 and 3, involving gains 
(positive amounts), we asked the subjects to choose between column A, which offered a 
sure income of 4000 Ugandan Shillings (USh) and column B, which offered two 
different amounts with probabilities. Considering the level of education and illiteracy of 
some of our subjects, we simplified the notion of probabilities using four balls. The 
point is illustrated using Figure 2 which replicates one of the answer sheets, namely that 
of game 2, which the subjects filled out. The circled numbers below ‘A’ and ‘B’ 
indicate the number of each ball. We explained to the subjects that after completing the 
forms, one of the rows in the games would be played for real using a bingo. With four 
balls in a bingo cage, each participant draws a ball. Suppose row 2-3 is to be played for 
real. Whatever ball, 1, 2, 3 or 4, is drawn, if the subject has chosen A, he or she will 
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receive 4000 USh. If the subject has chosen B and if ball 1, 2 or 3 is drawn, then the 
payoff will be 5000 USh, whereas if ball 4 is drawn, it will be 2000 USh. Thus, with a 
chance of three out of four times (or 75 per cent as indicated in Appendix Table 1), the 
payoff of column B will be 5000 USh. If the participant chooses column A, four out of 
four times (or with 100 per cent certainty), he or she will receive 4000 USh. Column B 
is progressively preferable as one goes down the list. The purpose of the games for the 
researcher is to identify the point at which the participant’s preference changes from A 
to B, which in turn indicates the range of the subject’s degree of risk aversion.13  
The fourth risk game, which involved gains and losses and was used to measure 
the loss aversion, and the four time preference games were played similarly, though the 
time preference games were played hypothetically due to logistical constraints. It is 
known that hypothetical questions often result in relatively higher revealed discount 
rates (Coller and Williams, 1999). Yet, the future cash payment to each participant 
requires careful arrangement with village elders and the process may vary from village 
to village. Considering the number of sample villages in our study, a compromise has 
been made on estimating the accurate level of the time preference. The estimated 
discount rate is still relevant to the extent that one of the main purposes of the study is 
to compare the degree of patience and not to measure the absolute level of the 
preferences.  
After all subjects had completed all eight answer sheets, the community leader 
drew a ball from a bingo cage containing 32 balls (eight balls for each of the rows in the 
                                                     
13 For example, if the subject chooses A in row 2-3, but chooses B in row 2-4, then mathematically, his or 
her risk preference can be represented as ସ଴଴଴
భష഑
ଵିఙ ൒ 0.75 ∗
ହ଴଴଴భష഑
ଵିఙ ൅ 0.25 ∗
ଶ଴଴଴భష഑
ଵିఙ  and 
ସ଴଴଴భష഑
ଵିఙ ൑ 0.75 ∗
ହହ଴଴భష഑
ଵିఙ ൅ 0.25 ∗
ଶ଴଴଴భష഑
ଵିఙ . Solving the two equations simultaneously, the interval of the risk aversion 
parameter is 0.92 ൏ 	ߪ	 ൑ 1.62. 
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four risk games). This ball determined the row number of the risk game to be played. 
Individuals then chose a ball from the four balls, 1, 2, 3 or 4, which identified the prize 
amount. Lastly, the payment was made according to the preferences revealed on the 
forms.14 
 
3.3 Estimation Methodology 
 In terms of the estimation methodology, we apply the interval regression. This 
estimation approach is suited for data that are collected as parameter intervals. Unlike 
the ordered probit model or the multinomial logit model, the constant-only model 
allows us to estimate the average preference parameter. Furthermore, the regression 
coefficients for the explanatory variables can be interpreted as the marginal increase for 
the unit change of the variable in the same manner as OLS coefficients. The formula is 
as follows.   
 Let ݕ௜∗ ൌ ߚᇱݔ௜ ൅ ߝ௜  where ݕ௜∗ represents the unobserved degree of risk or time 
preference and ݔ௜  is a vector of individual, household and regional characteristics of 
subject ݅. I assume that ߝ௜ is distributed normal with zero mean and the variance of ߪଶ. 
From our experiments, we can only observe ݕଵ and ݕଶ, not ݕ௜∗. The unobserved ݕ௜∗ is 
greater than lower bound ݕଵ (right-censored), smaller than or equal to upper bound ݕଶ 
(left-censored) or lies between ݕଵ and ݕଶ (interval-censored). The likelihood function is: 
 
                                                     
14 The possibility of the actual prize being a loss remained. In order to address the ethical issue, we 
offered 5000 USh for completing the games as a transport fee, thus the net gain ranged from 1000 USh to 
21,000 USh. (cf., the average per capita income of the sampled household is 152.7 USD as mentioned 
earlier, or around 1000 USh per day)  
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Lൌ∏ Pr൫yi*൑y2൯ ∙left‐censored ∏ Pr൫yi*൐y1൯ ∙right‐censored ∏ Pr൫y1൏yi*൑y2൯interval‐censored , 
or 
Lൌ∏ ߔሺݕଶ െ ߚᇱݔ௜ሻ∙left‐censored ∏ 1 െ ߔሺݕଵ െ ߚᇱݔ௜ሻ∙right‐censored   
     ∏ ߔሺݕଶ െ ߚᇱݔ௜ሻ െ ߔሺݕଵ െ ߚᇱݔ௜ሻinterval‐censored .  
 
Next, its log-likelihood is maximized: 
݈݊Lൌ∑ ݈݊ሾߔሺݕଶ െ ߚᇱݔ௜ሻሿ ൅௟௘௙௧ି௖௘௡௦௢௥௘ௗ ∑ ݈݊ሾ1 െ ߔሺݕଵ െ ߚᇱݔ௜ሻሿ ൅௥௜௚௛௧ି௖௘௡௦௢௥௘ௗ   
    ∑ ݈݊ሾߔሺݕଶ െ ߚᇱݔ௜ሻ െ ߔሺݕଵ െ ߚᇱݔ௜ሻሿ௜௡௧௘௥௩௔௟ି௖௘௡௦௢௥௘ௗ . 
  
The errors are assumed to be correlated across the games of the same individual. 
Therefore, the clustering option is applied around individuals.  
The level of loss aversion is estimated using the risk aversion parameter ߪ as 
elicited in game 1 and 3. Using the mean value of the estimated ߪ for each individual 
and together with the value function, ݑሺܯሻ ൌ െߣ ∗ ሺିெሻభష഑ଵିఙ  for losses, i.e. ܯ ൏ 0, we 
compute the range of loss aversion parameter ߣ for each switching point by equating the 
expected utilities in column A and B.15 
For the time preference, we use the data from games 5 to 8 in order to identify 
the intervals of the discount rates. The value function is ݒሺܯ଴ሻ ൌ ଵሺଵା௥ሻ೟ ∙ ݒሺܯ௧ሻ  where 
ܯ଴ is the present value for the individual facing the payoff ܯ௧	offered at time ݐ with 
discount rate ݎ. Here, the assumption is that ݒሺܯ௧ሻ ൌ ܯ௧. By equating the switching 
point between two choices, we derive the subjective discount rate. For example, if the 
                                                     
15 We take the boundary values of ߪ for right censored and left censored data. 
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subject switches from Column A to B in row 6-4, then his or her time preference is 
represented by ଵሺଵା௥ሻర ∙ ሺ10,000ሻ ൑
ଵ
ሺଵା௥ሻల ∙ ሺ18,000ሻ   or ݎ ൑ 0.3416.  
In order to test the existence of present bias, we create a “present bias” dummy 
for games 5 and 7. Game 5 and 7, and 6 and 8 are exactly the same, except for the front-
end delays: this means that the earlier date that participants can hypothetically receive 
the pay-off in game 5 and 7 is today whereas in game 6 and 8 it is delayed to four or 
five months later (Appendix Table 2). If the individuals show no sign of present bias, 
then the switch points or the discount rates should be exactly the same for game 5 and 6 
(or for game 7 and 8). 
Lastly, we test the correlation between the estimated risk aversion parameter and 
the estimated subjective discount rates by including the risk aversion parameter in the 
regression analysis for the discount rate. 
There are other ways to model risk and time preference data. For instance, 
Andersen et al. (2008) use a structural approach where the degree of risk aversion and 
the subjective discount rate are modelled in a single equation that represents the net 
present value of total utility derived from the payoffs in the risk and time experiments.16 
Such structural models may be more tractable in relation to the theoretical framework 
and probably offer more accurate estimates of parameters, but the choice of model is 
partly dictated by the availability of data, and partly by the different focus of the 
research interest. In our case, we model the risk aversion and discount rates separately 
                                                     
16 They assume that the payoffs from the risk experiment are used for current consumption by the 
participants, while the payoffs from the time experiment are integrated with background consumption 
over a longer period. 
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due to the hypothetical nature of the latter that may lead to distorted results if integrated 
with the risk data.  
The explanatory variables used in the regression analysis are as follows. Six 
agro-climatic zone dummy variables are created to categorize the villages, as explained 
in the data section. ‘South-western highlands’ is the base group. The “distance to town” 
variable measures the distance from a particular reference point in the village to the 
district town in miles. For the road condition variables, I use the ‘all tarmac’ dummy 
variable which takes one if the road to the district town is mainly a tarmac road 
throughout the year, and zero otherwise. Furthermore, an interaction term variable is 
created with the ‘all tarmac’ dummy and the distance to town to test whether the effect 
of distance is different for tarmac and non-tarmac roads. “Population density” is the 
number of people per square miles in the village. “Number of schools” is the number of 
primary and secondary schools in the village. We also include the log of the village 
mean asset value and the mean land size of the sample households to represent the 
wealth level of the villages. 
In terms of game-related variables, we include the “expected value,” which is 
the average payoff in column B for each of the games 1 to 3. According to the 
increasing partial risk aversion hypothesis, we expect to find that the larger stakes in 
game 3 induce higher risk aversion. The “present bias” dummy is a dummy for games 5 
and 7 which do not have front-end delays. The “risk aversion” and “loss aversion” 
variables are calculated as mid-points of the interval coded parameters σ and 
 respectively as elicited in the experiment for each individual. 
For household variables, the log of asset value and the log of land size are used 
as household wealth variables. Among other household characteristics is “household 
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size,” the number of household members that had lived in the household for more than 3 
months in the past 12 months; and “dependency ratio,” calculated following Yesuf 
(2009): the ratio of household members below the age of 15 to household members 
aged 15 and over. We expect that members of smaller households with many children 
are relatively more risk-averse due to the lower ability to cope with financial risks. For 
basic individual characteristics, we include gender, age and schooling variables, the last 
of which is the number of years that the person attended school. We also include a 
“head” dummy which takes one if the individual is the head of the household and zero 
otherwise. The head of a household may have different preferences due to the financial 
responsibility they bear for the household members. We test whether the household and 
individual variables still correlate with the individual preferences after controlling for 
the village characteristics. 
 
4. Results 
4.1   Experimental Results 
 Tables 3.1 and 3.2 show the raw statistics from the experiments. The category 
names used in Table 3.1 correspond to the different rows at which the respondents 
switched from choosing column A to B, and are useful only to the extent that they label 
the direction of the attitude, which becomes more risk-averse as one goes down the list. 
Heterogeneity in the risk preferences is indicated by the wide spread of the respondents 
across the categories. It is noteworthy that significant numbers of respondents are on 
one of the extreme ends of the risk attitude categories. Figure 3 shows all the possible 
combinations of responses in game 1 and 2 on the floor surface and the frequency of 
responses are represented by the height of the columns. Here, we can visually see that 
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more than 100 respondents have chosen to switch at row 2 (risk loving or neutral) in 
both game 1 and 2 and around 140 respondents have chosen to switch at row 8 (very 
risk averse). 
 The descriptive statistics from Table 3.1 also suggest existence of loss aversion. 
For the gains-only games 1, 2 and 3, around 20 to 30 per cent of the respondents are 
“highly” or “very” risk-averse. For the gain-and-loss game 4, however, over 40 per cent 
of the respondents are “highly” or “very” risk-averse, 10 to 20 per cent higher than in 
the gains-only games, indicating that subjects choose safer option when the game 
involves losses. 
 As for the time preference, we can see from the first row of Table 3.2 that a 
large portion of the respondents show patience once the front-end delay is implemented. 
The portion of respondents choosing the later payments in the first row (switch-point 1, 
indicating strong patience) increases from 9.8 per cent in game 5 to 22.2 per cent in 
game 6. It increases from 20.2 per cent in game 7 to 31.2 per cent in game 8. At the 
same time, a substantial portion of the subjects exhibit high discount rates of more than 
75 per cent. This may be due to the hypothetical nature of the question and/or the high 
degree of risk aversion among these individuals. 
 Note that around 6 to 8 per cent of the answers in each of the risk games and less 
than 5 per cent in time preference games are considered irrational.17 The proportion of 
such irrational answers in our study is comparable to those in other studies, ranging 
from around 4 to 12 per cent (Holt and Laury, 2002; Harrison, Lau and Williams, 2002; 
                                                     
17 Some have chosen the sure income in column A over the lottery with a chance of winning the same 
amount as the sure income and another higher amount in column B (see Appendix Table 1). Similarly, 
some have chosen the risky option, column B, even where the same amount as the sure income and a 
smaller amount is offered. Others have switched from risky to sure income as the expected payoff of the 
gamble become higher. Finally, some others have switched multiple times in a game. 
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Yesuf, 2004). Nonetheless, when we put all the games together, both the discount rates 
and risk aversion, the total attrition becomes 18 per cent, which is larger than the 
average in the past. This could be due to the fact that we conducted a series of games 
and also combined both the time and risk experiment together, which is usually not the 
case. The test for the difference of means in the main characteristics of those 
respondents with irrational answers and rational answers shows that there are 
statistically differences (Appendix Table 3). The respondents with irrational answers 
have, on average, one year less schooling and are a few years older than those with 
rational answers. However, there is no statistically significant difference in the 
household characteristics between them. Due to the inability to estimate the parameters, 
we exclude those irrational answers from the analysis below. 
 The estimated parameters for risk aversion, loss aversion and discount rates 
using the constant-only interval regression are summarized in Table 4. The overall 
average degree of risk aversion is 1.32, which is comparable to that estimated between 
0.81 and 2.0 in another African country, Zambia, (Wik and Holden, 1998 as cited in 
Cardenas and Carpenter, 2008). The estimated value of loss aversion   is 3.93. This 
value of   is substantially higher than the estimates from previous studies of around 
2.63 or 2.25 (Tanaka et al., 2010; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). This is partly due to 
the average being pulled upward by the many subjects that showed risk loving or risk 
neutral behaviour in the gains-only games and chose the safest options in the gains and 
losses game (13.9 per cent of total respondents).18 The loss aversion seems to be an 
important characterization of risk attitude among our sample. Note that the loss aversion 
                                                     
18 Comparing the degrees of loss aversion across different degrees of risk aversion, we find that on 
average “risk-averse (0 < σ < 2)” people have λ=2.49, “very risk-averse (σ > 2)” people have λ=4.32 and 
“risk neutral to risk loving (σ < 0)” have λ=6.35 (regression results not shown). 
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parameter ߣ is estimated using a single risk aversion parameter or the utility curvature ߪ 
for each individual whether the person is risk loving, neutral or averse. Such a method is 
different from those applied by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) who allowed different 
utility curvatures for gain and loss frames or Tanaka et al. (2010) whose subjects only 
revealed risk aversion. Nonetheless, for the average person, who is a risk-averse person 
with σ=1.6, the estimated ߣ is 2.7 which is comparable to that found by past papers. 
 Lastly, the average discount rate is 47.5 per cent. Similar to the descriptive 
analysis, this monthly discount rate is substantially higher than those found in previous 
studies, which are usually measured in annual rates. A large part of the deviation 
probably comes from the hypothetical nature of the question. The focus, however, is not 
so much on the absolute values of the discount rates as on their relationship to other 
characteristics of time preference and variation across individuals. 
 One of our main objectives is to test heterogeneity in the preferences across 
agro-climatic zones. Table 4 shows that the average values of risk aversion, loss 
aversion and discount rate are all higher than the overall average in the uni-modal 
rainfall zone, while they are all lower than the overall average in the low potential bi-
modal rainfall zone or in the south-western highlands. In the other zones, some of the 
parameters are higher than the overall average, while other parameters are lower.  Such 
heterogeneity in the preferences may be due to the agro-climatic nature of the area or 
other village level factors. Further regression results are presented in the next section. 
 
4.2    Determinants of risk aversion 
 The regression results for the determinants of risk aversion are shown in Table 5. 
Column (A) is a result with agro-climatic zones only where the south-western highlands 
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is the base group. All zone dummies are significant and positive with the highest risk 
aversion seen among individuals in the uni-modal rainfall zone, followed by the eastern 
highlands area and the high potential bi-modal rainfall zone. These are the three areas 
where the high value crop, coffee, is produced by more than 40 per cent of the 
households (Table 2; Yamano et al., 2004). Risk aversion may be correlated with the 
high-risk high-return crop.  
 Column (B) shows the result including other village level variables. The ranking 
of the average risk aversion remains the same as in Column (A) but the statistical 
significance disappears for some zones partly due to the differences in the other 
variables representing village-level characteristics absorbing the differences across the 
agro-climatic zones. Villages with tarmac roads to the district town have on average 
higher risk aversion than those with non-tarmac roads. Furthermore, for those villages 
with tarmac roads, the further away from town, the less risk-averse people are. This is 
counter-intuitive in the sense that we would expect people in villages with tarmac road 
and that are closer to town have more access to information and generally better 
economic condition, resulting in the more pro-investment preferences. The log of 
average land size is also positively correlated with the farmers’ risk aversion. People in 
villages with larger average land size and better road access may exhibit more risk 
aversion in the experiment if they already face considerable risk in investing in high-
risk high-return crops, such as coffee, in real life. Alternatively, the direction of 
causality may be the opposite. Villages with people that are more risk-averse may 
attempt to buy more land or influence the local government to improve the road 
conditions to stabilize the transport of farm inputs and crops. On average, the household 
land size has increased two per cent between 2003 and 2009 (Yamano et al., 2004). 
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Further analysis on changes in individual land size and preference may reveal more 
insight. The causal relationship between the individual preferences and road 
construction is harder to test for the decision for the latter is more collective. Other 
variables including average asset value, population density and number of schools are 
not significantly correlated with the individuals’ risk aversion. 
 Column (C) shows the result including household and individual characteristics 
as well as the expected value. None of the household variables are significant. 
Household wealth or household demography seems not to correlate with risk aversion. 
For individual variables, age or schooling does not correlate with risk aversion. Women, 
however, are more risk averse than men. 
 The coefficient on the expected value indicates that people reveal decreased 
partial risk aversion, which is contrary to our expectation. This may be due to the fact 
that in game 3, which has larger stakes than in game 1 or 2, the decisions were more 
influenced by the sheer size of the larger amounts in column B, namely “10,000,” 
“13,000” and “16,000” than by the expected payoffs. The respondents may have been 
induced to be more risk-seeking by the sudden increase in the payoffs offered without 
considering the probabilities attached.  
 
4.3   Determinants of loss aversion 
 The predictors of loss aversion are presented in Table 6. In Column (A), we 
see that there is a wide difference in loss aversion across agro-climatic zones. Even 
controlling for village level factors in column (B), we find that individuals in the 
medium potential bi-modal rainfall zones and uni-modal rainfall zone are significantly 
more loss averse than those from other zones. While the two zones have rice production 
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as a common characteristic, it is not clear how rice production relates to higher aversion 
to losses unless the low rice harvest in 2008 due to poor weather affected the farmers’ 
aversion to losses (New Vision, 30 June 2010). In column (B), we find that the villages 
with tarmac roads to district towns have on average lower loss aversion than those with 
dirt roads, and the log of average land size correlates negatively with loss aversion. 
These results are consistent with our expectation that those people in wealthier villages 
with better road access are less loss averse. Comparing the village-level covariates of 
the preferences between risk aversion and loss aversion, the effects of the road condition, 
the distance to the district town and the average wealth level are opposite: individuals in 
the villages with lower wealth or less favourable access to town are less risk averse but 
more loss averse. This indicates that loss aversion may be a more important 
characterization of poorer villages. Nonetheless, households in the uni-modal zone are 
more risk averse and loss averse than those in any other zone.  
 In terms of the individual and household characteristics, we find that higher 
household wealth level, more years of schooling and older age are associated with less 
loss aversion after controlling for the village level factors. Gender has no statistically 
significant effect on loss aversion.  
 
4.4  Determinants of discount rates 
 The results on discount rates are shown in Table 7. In Column (A), we see that 
the uni-modal zone has the highest average discount rate and the eastern highlands has 
the second highest. In column (B), the tarmac road dummy is significantly correlated 
with a lower discount rate or more patience. For those with tarmac roads, the further 
away the village is from the district town, the less patient the people are. Individuals in 
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the villages with higher average asset value are more patient. The correlation between 
higher average wealth or better access to town and lower discount rate is as expected. 
Again, the causality may be not so much that the economically favourable environment 
of the villages induces patience but that the villagers’ patience induces long-term 
investment in productive activities or drives infrastructure projects. In terms of the 
number of local schools, it is negatively correlated with patience, in contrast to our 
expectation.  
 In column (D), we see that while individuals with more schooling are more 
patient, household heads are more impatient than others. Age or gender does not have 
significant effect on patience. In terms of the game effects, present bias does exist, and 
the more risk-averse and loss averse people are, the more impatient they are. 
 
5. Discussion 
 In the above results, we have seen that risk aversion, loss aversion and patience 
are different across agro-climatic zones. In order to test the significance of the 
differences among all zones (not only against the south-western highlands), the same 
regression exercises are carried out with base dummies other than that of the south-
western highlands. The significance of the zone dummies varies with different 
specification, but one result remains the same: all three preference parameters are 
highest for the uni-modal zone among all zones.  
 We suggested in the result section that the subjects in the uni-modal zone may 
be relatively more risk/loss averse or impatient due to the variability of crop yields due 
to erratic rainfalls. The situation may be exacerbated by the low soil quality. The FAO’s 
categorization of agro-ecological zones that overlaps with that of Pender et al (2004) 
GRIPS Policy Research Center Discussion Paper : 11-19
32 
 
shows that in the uni-modal zone, not only the rainfall season is relatively short, but also 
the soil fertility is lower than in other zones, resulting in the choice of crops that are 
drought tolerant (FAO, 1999).19  
 
5.1 Extension - modelling probability weighting 
 We have estimated the risk aversion parameter assuming EUT to be true. In recent 
experiment studies, however, an alternative model of probability weighting has been 
modelled (Humphrey and Verschoor, 2004; Tanaka et al., 2010; Harrison et al., 2010). 
This concept from prospect theory states that individuals do not simply take the 
probabilities ݌௜ given in the problem  ∑ ݌௜ݑሺ ௜ܹሻ௡௜ୀଵ  as they are, but subjectively weight 
them, i.e. maximizing ∑ ߨ௜ݑሺ ௜ܹሻ௡௜ୀଵ   where ߨ௜ ൌ ݂ሺ݌௜ሻ (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). 
The evidence of probability weighting is ample, and may affect the magnitude of risk 
aversion in our analysis, too (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tanaka et al., 2010; 
Humphrey and Verschoor, 2004). The initial evidence by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) 
is that probability weighting takes the inverse-S shape, implying overweighting of small 
probabilities and underweighting of large probabilities regardless of the relative sizes of 
the prospects to which the probabilities are attached. A recent study in rural Vietnam 
also supports this theory (Tanaka et al., 2010). The intuition given for the inverted-S 
shape probability function is that sensitivity increases around boundaries. However, the 
evidence from East Uganda given by Humphrey and Verschoor (2004) suggests the 
opposite; namely, S-shape probability weighting. The authors suggest that such an 
underweighting of small probabilities may possibly be due to highly volatile 
                                                     
19 The “Annual Cropping and Cattle Teso system” and “Annual cropping and Cattle Northern system” in 
the FAO (1999) zones cover the uni-modal zone in our sample. 
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environments. One may be induced to disregard the possibility of a certain amount of 
income if the chance is relatively small since the variability of income is too high 
anyway. 
  Therefore, we estimate the degree of risk aversion and the probability weighting 
simultaneously by constructing the random utility model following the maximum 
likelihood method by Harrison (2008). We assume the Tversky and Kahneman (1992) 
function, ߨ ൌ ݌ఊ ሾ݌ఊ ൅ ሺ1 െ ݌ሻఊሿଵ ఊ⁄⁄   for ߨ௜ and CRRA utility function, ݑሺܯሻ ൌ ெ
భష഑
ଵିఙ . 
  The result is shown in Appendix Table 4. The result shows that the heterogeneity 
across agro-climatic zones still holds. The rankings of the degree of risk aversion are 
now different for many zones, except for the uni-modal rainfall zone being the most 
risk-averse. Thus, under the prospect theory of probability weighting, the result remains 
fairly stable. In terms of probability weighting, we find that most zones exhibit the 
inverse-S shape probability weighting function consistent with the results from most 
past studies, the uni-modal rainfall zone being an exception exhibiting an S-shape 
function. The uni-modal zone that is situated in the eastern region of Uganda, however, 
does not coincide with the village in the eastern highlands where Humphrey and 
Verschoor (2004) witnessed the S-shape probability weighting. Nonetheless, there may 
be some characteristics that are common in the sampled villages that are in the same 
region of the country. 
 
5.2 Extension – including ethnic groups control 
Another robustness check is carried out using ethnic groups. As shown in Figure 4, 
some of the ethnic boundaries overlap with those of the agro-climatic zones. Our 
concern was that given a high correlation between the two categorizations, we may be 
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reporting differences in ethnicity-related preferences and not those affected by agro-
climatic conditions. Studies from developed countries discuss the differences in 
consumer behaviours and attitudes towards risks across ethnic groups (Ogden et al., 
2004; Yao et al., 2005). Therefore, we report the regression results including the ethnic 
group dummies in Appendix Table 5. Each of the three preference parameters is 
estimated using two different sets of ethnic groups. Column (A), (C) and (E) show the 
results using ethnic dummies that correspond to broad groups as seen in Figure 4. The 
base group is “other”. Column (B), (D) and (F) are the results with dummies 
representing ethnicity as reported by the household head.  In all estimations we find that 
our main results regarding the uni-modal zone remain the same. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 Risks in agriculture continue to pose challenges to farmers in developing 
countries. In order to reduce such variability in agricultural income, research into 
disaster management and projects to improve agricultural technology are being 
conducted by the government of Uganda and the international development agencies 
(Government of Uganda, 2008; World Bank, 2010). Our goal in this study is to identify 
the potential role of regional factors as well as individual and household characteristics 
that may affect the investment-related preferences of the rural households in such efforts 
to improve their livelihoods. From the large-scale experiment eliciting the farmers’ risk 
and time preferences, we contribute several important findings.  
 First, we find that average risk aversion, loss aversion and discount rate differ 
across agro-climatic zones. These results may be driven by the types of crops produced 
in the areas. The highest risk aversion exhibited in the experiment is in the coffee 
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growing areas and may be due to the risks already taken in real-life investment. In rice 
producing areas, the temporal weather shocks in 2008 may have induced strong loss 
aversion. More importantly, we find a significant result that households in the uni-
modal zone villages are on average more risk-averse, more loss-averse and less patient 
than the farmers from other zones. This suggests a correlation between the farmers’ 
preferences and the relative low agro-climatic conditions. The single rainfall season 
with overall relatively short growing period and low soil fertility implies that any erratic 
rainfall may severely affect the farmers’ crop yields and in turn their attitudes towards 
risks and subjective discount rates regarding future investments. 
 Stronger risk aversion could be attributed not to pure preferences but to 
background risks such as higher variability in income due to risky crop types or 
unfavourable rain conditions (Gollier and Pratt, 1996), but the evidence is difficult to 
obtain. Neither the previous literature (e.g. Pender et al., 2004), the external statistics 
(FAO, 1999), nor our study has clear evidence that uni-modal rainfall zone has a unique 
characteristic such as extremely erratic rainfall or variable crop yields. We have 
controlled for the ethnic groups that may correlate with the zone boundaries and found 
that the variation in the preferences still remain. In terms of external evidence on the 
variability of rainfall, most of the severest droughts are witnessed in the Karamoja 
regions in the north-west and floods occur in the bi-modal rainfall areas as well as the 
uni-modal areas (EM-DAT, 2011). Thus, we do not have independent measures of risks 
in different regions in order to differentiate between interpretations: risk preferences 
differ, background risks differ or differences in background risks cause the changes in 
risk preferences. This may be an area for further research. 
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Another limitation is that the one-time elicitation of preferences does not reveal 
the entire process by which the preferences and the agro-climatic conditions may 
correlate. Further research into the dynamic nature of investment related preferences 
and the farmers’ environment may be important, especially in times where climate 
change is influencing the agricultural production in developing countries. Nonetheless, 
our evidence is the first of its kind, revealing a statistically significant relationship 
between climatic and topographical conditions and investment related preferences. 
 It is worthy of note that agro-ecological zones which are constructed by 
classifying villages and areas by “multivariate similarities” (Ruecker et al., 2003) do not 
have strict boundaries. Therefore, our result based on agro-ecological zones is useful 
only to the extent that it represents the average effect of the agro-ecological condition, 
and not the effect for the entire population within the artificial boundaries on the map. 
The individuals in the uni-modal zone may be on average more risk averse and 
impatient than those in other zones, but further investigation may reveal heterogeneous 
trends of preferences within the uni-modal zone. 
 Our second contribution is that we found that village level predictors are 
different for the risk aversion from those for loss aversion or the discount rate. While 
higher risk aversion correlates with wealthier villages with more land, higher loss 
aversion and discount rate correlate with poorer villages with lower asset values. Our 
results from a large sample confirm the result by Tanaka et al. (2010) that loss aversion, 
rather than risk aversion, is the characteristic of households in poorer villages in 
developing countries.  
 Third, we have shown that infrastructure, after controlling for the village wealth 
level, correlate with loss aversion and the discount rate. Such aspects of regional 
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variation can be improved or developed through policies, possibly resulting in more 
pro-investment preferences of the farmers. While improvements in road conditions may 
directly improve the economic welfare of the villagers through lower transaction cost, 
they may do so indirectly, too, through the impact on the perception of future economic 
opportunities by the people living in the areas.  
 Last, we have seen that after controlling for the village level factors, the level of 
schooling still correlates with both loss aversion and discount rates. The policy 
implication is that schooling not only increases individual income through increase in 
productivity but also possibly through inducing more pro-investment preferences.  
 In conclusion, our investigation into the determinants of the risk and time 
preferences has revealed that village and regional level factors affect the preferences. 
On one hand, the knowledge of agro-climatic conditions that affect the livelihood of the 
farmers may help shed light on the investment behaviour at the time of policy 
implementation. On the other hand, village level development, in infrastructure for 
instance, may improve the household perception on investment related policies that 
involves judgments on future uncertain income.  
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Table 1: Sampled Individuals 
 Respondent Non-Respondent
 All Panel Neighbour Diff. Panel Diff. 
 (a) (b) (c) (b)-(c) (d) (b)-(d)
Individual  Characteristics mean mean Mean  mean  
Gender (Male=1) 0.68 0.69 0.67 0.02   
 (0.47) (0.46) (0.47)    
Age 45.0 47.0 41.8 5.22***   
 (14.7) (15.0) (13.74)    
Literate (Yes=1) 0.66 0.64 0.69 -0.05*   
 (0.47) (0.48) (0.46)    
Schooling 5.70 5.44 6.09 -0.65***   
 (3.67) (3.69) (3.61)    
Household Characteristics       
Household Size  7.72   7.21 0.51 
  (3.82)   (4.15)  
Dependency Ratio  1.19   1.08 0.11 
  (0.87)   (0.88)  
Female Headed (=1)  0.12   0.12 0.0 
  (0.33)   (0.33)  
Per capita income (US$)  152.7   177.4 -24.7 
  (240.1)   (271.5)  
Value of Assets (US$)  207.2   160.6 46.6 
  (677.0)   (247.2)  
Own Land Size (acre)  5.74   3.19 2.55 
  (23.65)   (3.80)  
       
No. of Observations 1279 787 502  154  
Note: in parenthesis are standard deviations. * indicates significance level at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.  
Dependency ratio is the ratio of the number of household members below age 15 to that of members 
above or equal to age 15. Per capita income and value of assets are valued at 2005 rate of 1US$ = 1730 
Ugandan Shillings. 
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Table 2: Sampled Villages 
Agro-Climatic Zone1 
Bi-Low
Rainfall
Bi-Med
Rainfall
Bi-High
Rainfall
Uni- 
Modal
Eastern  
Highlands 
SW 
Highlands
Land size (acre) 8.6 10.5 5.6 5.6 3.5 4.2 
Per capita expenditure (US$) 295 221 271 244 209 320 
% Producer Households:       
  Maize 86.8 91.0 92.8 79.1 91.8 74.0 
  Matooke 90.0 41.2 62.1 69.6 72.4 60.7 
  Coffee 30.5 24.3 53.6 55.2 76.5 23.7 
  Sweet Potato 48.6 79.3 78.2 41.7 18.2 54.5 
  Cassava 49.7 78.8 79.0 82.0 45.9 28.6 
  Rice 0 14.8 2.6 4.5 0 0 
Distance to town (miles) 22.7 13.0 15.4 6.1 10.5 7.5 
%Village with road condition:       
  All season tarmac 41.6 5.2 29.0 25.0 25.0 6.6 
  Seasonal dirt 16.7 5.3 6.5 0 25.0 26.7 
  All season dirt 41.7 89.5 64.5 75.0 50.0 66.7 
Population density ( / km2)2 100 100 371 480 98 154 
No. of local schools3 1.2 0.8 1.9 0.6 0.4 0.6 
No. of Villages 12 19 31 8 8 15 
Note: All data from 2009, except for those stated otherwise. 1. The high potential bi-modal (Bi-High) 
rainfall zone covers mostly the Lake Victoria crescent, the medium potential bi-modal  (Bi-Med) rainfall 
zone most of the central and parts of western Uganda, the low potential bi-modal  (Bi-Low) rainfall zone 
the lower elevation parts of south-western Uganda. Other zones are the high potential bi-modal rainfall 
south-western (SW) highlands and the high potential uni-modal rainfall eastern (Eastern) Highlands at 
1500 metres above sea level and above and the uni-modal (Uni-Modal) rainfall zone that covers part of 
eastern Uganda. 2. Population density data are from year 2003.  3. Number of local schools data are from 
year 2005. 
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 Table 3.1:  Distribution of Risk Preferences among the Respondents   
 
Switch  Gains Only  Gain & Loss
Point  Game 1 Game 2 Game 3  Game 4 
  % % %  % 
2 Very Risk Loving 15.1 16.4 15.9  2.1 
3 Risk Loving to Risk Neutral 11.9 11.6 14.1  15.7 
4 Slightly Risk-Averse 9.6 9.2 8.7  11.7 
5 Moderately Risk-Averse 9.8 14.9 9.9  12.2 
6 Intermediate Risk-Averse 17.3 10.2 22.9  7.4 
7 Highly Risk-Averse 9.5 14.1 7.7  11.5 
8 Very Risk-Averse 19.8 16.4 14.6  31.5 
 Irrational Answers 7.0 7.1 6.2  7.9 
   All A (2.4) (2.7) (1.7)  (3.3) 
   All B (0.9) - (1.2)  (0.5) 
   Reversed choice  (0.1) (3.4) -  (0.1) 
   Multiple Switching (3.7) (3.4) (3.3)  (4.0) 
 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0  100.0 
 
 
 
Table 3.2:  Distribution of Time Preferences among the Respondents   
 
Switch 
point 
Monthly 
Discount Rate 
(%) 
No front 
–end 
delay 
Front-
end 
delay 
Monthly 
Discount Rate 
(%) 
No front –
end delay 
Front-
end 
delay 
Game 5 Game 6 Game 7 Game 8
  % %  % % 
1 0 – 9.54 9.8 22.2 0 – 10.00 20.2 31.2 
2 9.54 – 18.32 5.2 6.7 10.00 – 20.00 9.6 5.8 
3 18.32 – 26.49 9.8 13.3 20.00 – 30.00 13.5 11.9 
4 26.49 – 34.16 13.1 15.7 30.00 – 40.00 16.8 11.2 
5 34.16 – 50.00 26.5 18.9 40.00 – 55.56 20.1 22.4 
6 50.00 – 73.21 8.5 4.3 55.56 – 75.00 4.4 3.7 
7 73.21 – 112.13 6.6 3.8 75.00 – 100.00 3.4 1.6 
8 112.13 – 200.00 5.7 2.7 100.00 – 180.00 1.9 3.6 
 200.00 - 12.6 7.6 180.00 – 8.1 4.7 
 Irrational 2.2 4.8 Irrational Answers 2.0 3.9 
 Reversed choice (0.8) (2.3) Reversed choice (0.5) (1.2) 
  Multiple (1.4) (2.4)  Multiple (1.6) (2.7) 
 Total 100.0 100.0 Total 100.0 100.0 
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Table 4: Risk Aversion, Loss Aversion and Discount Rate by Agro-Climatic Zone 
 
Agro-Climatic  
Zone 
Total 
Bi-Low
Rainfall
Bi-Med
Rainfall
Bi-High
Rainfall
Uni- 
Modal
Eastern 
Highlands 
SW 
Highlands
        
Risk Aversion (σ) 1.32 1.18 1.14 1.41 2.22 1.56 0.72 
Loss Aversion (λ) 3.93 1.88 5.34 3.83 6.98 3.39 2.72 
Discount Rate (r) 47.5 27.4 50.6 47.3 66.7 55.2 38.5 
        
No. of households 1040 115 232 369 112 97 115 
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Table 5: Predictors of Risk Aversion (Interval Regression) 
 
 (A) (B) (C) 
Village Characteristics  
Agro-climatic Zones1  
 Bi – Low 0.516**2 0.429* 0.536** 
 (2.45) (1.70) (1.91) 
 Bi – Medium 0.482** 0.080 -0.017 
 (2.30) (0.34) (-0.07) 
 Bi – High 0.744*** 0.611*** 0.647*** 
 (4.26) (3.24) (3.15) 
 Uni – Modal 1.423*** 1.130*** 1.140*** 
 (5.30) (4.09) (3.95) 
 Eastern Highlands 0.906*** 0.981*** 0.986*** 
 (3.93) (4.05) (3.80) 
Distance to town -0.008 -0.010 
 (-1.25) (-1.37) 
All Tarmac dummy 0.672*** 0.592** 
 (2.38) (2.01) 
Distance to town * All tarmac dummy -0.035*** -0.037*** 
 (-2.70) (-2.71) 
Population Density -0.000 -0.000 
 (-0.59) (-0.63) 
Number of schools 0.032 0.04 
 (0.88) (1.13) 
Log of average asset value -0.004 -0.058 
 (-0.04) (-0.54) 
Log of average land size 0.560*** 0.529*** 
 (4.65) (3.99) 
Household Characteristics  
Household Size -0.007 
 (-0.30) 
Dependency Ratio 0.063 
 (0.83) 
Log of Land Size 0.096 
 (1.24) 
Log of Asset Value -0.021 
 (-0.31) 
Expected Value -0.002*** 
 (-9.11) 
Individual Characteristics  
Age -0.007 
 (-1.56) 
Female 0.296* 
 (1.76) 
Schooling 0.015 
 (0.85) 
Head 0.071 
 (0.38) 
Constant 0.660*** 0.04 11.05*** 
 (4.55) (0.03) (6.10) 
Log Likelihood -6249 -6214 -5747 
Observations 3120 3120 2898 
Note: 1.The base dummy for agro-climatic zones is the south-western highlands. 2. Robust z-statistics in 
 parentheses:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 6: Predictors of Loss Aversion (Interval Regression) 
 (A) (B) (C) 
Village Characteristics  
Agro-climatic Zones1  
 Bi – Low -0.824***2 0.051 -0.345 
 (-2.73) (0.13) (-0.80) 
 Bi – Medium 2.000*** 2.354*** 2.034*** 
 (5.22) (5.16) (4.17) 
 Bi – High 0.928*** 0.879*** 0.545 
 (2.99) (2.52) (1.45) 
 Uni – Modal 3.135*** 3.317*** 3.153*** 
 (6.14) (6.09) (5.55) 
 Eastern Highlands 0.681* 1.061*** 0.735 
 (1.64) (2.39) (1.52) 
Distance to town 0.012 0.019 
 (0.95) (1.35) 
All Tarmac dummy -1.497*** -1.089** 
 (-3.24) (2.29) 
Distance to town * All tarmac dummy -0.003 -0.016 
 (-0.18) (-0.78) 
Population Density 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (4.07) (4.01) 
Number of schools 0.212*** 0.203** 
 (2.36) (2.03) 
Log of average asset value -0.292 -0.153 
 (-1.60) (-0.77) 
Log of average land size -0.511** -0.723*** 
 (-2.12) (-2.82) 
Household Characteristics  
Household Size 0.141*** 
 (3.65) 
Dependency Ratio -0.207 
 (-1.61) 
Log of Land Size 0.147 
 (1.04) 
Log of Asset Value -0.244** 
 (-1.96) 
Individual Characteristics  
Age -0.019** 
 (-2.07) 
Female -0.437 
 (-1.41) 
Schooling -0.099*** 
 (-2.87) 
Head -0.073 
 (-0.21) 
Constant 2.856*** 6.778*** 9.127*** 
 (12.05) (2.84) (3.47) 
  
Log Likelihood -2619 -2588 -2369 
Observations 1040 1040 966 
Note: 1. The base dummy for agro-climatic zones is the south-western highlands. 2. Robust z-statistics in 
  parentheses:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 7: Predictors of Discount Rate (Interval Regression) 
(A) (B) (C) (D) 
Village Characteristics  
Agro-climatic Zones1  
 Bi – Low -11.26***2 -8.48** -12.20*** -12.65***
 (-3.16) (-2.03) (-2.64) (-2.73) 
 Bi – Medium 11.54*** 13.29*** 12.01** 8.056 
 (2.76) (2.72) (2.30) (1.56) 
 Bi – High 8.02** 7.174* 5.616 3.477 
 (2.07) (1.77) (1.35) (0.84) 
 Uni – Modal 26.66*** 27.49*** 27.75*** 19.83***
 (4.69) (4.67) (4.57) (3.40) 
 Eastern Highlands 16.22*** 16.49*** 15.83*** 12.36**
 (2.99) (3.18) (2.87) (2.27) 
Distance to town -0.033 -0.045 -0.053 
 (-0.25) (-0.31) (-0.36) 
All Tarmac dummy -13.37*** -10.85** -11.26**
 (-2.49) (-1.93) (-1.98) 
Distance to town * All tarmac dummy 0.466** 0.445* 0.640***
 (2.03) (1.82) (2.51) 
Population Density 0.006*** 0.005** 0.004* 
 (2.59) (2.25) (1.79) 
Number of schools 0.851 1.120* 0.597 
 (1.33) (1.71) (0.87) 
Log of average asset value -5.197** -3.992* -3.506 
 (-2.48) (-1.79) (-1.56) 
Log of average land size -2.050 -2.428 -2.300 
 (-0.86) (-0.91) (-0.81) 
Household Characteristics  
Household Size 0.402 0.165 
 (0.98) (0.39) 
Dependency Ratio -0.862 -0.784 
 (-0.56) (-0.51) 
Log of Land Size -0.773 -1.459 
 (-0.50) (-0.97) 
Log of Asset Value -0.072 0.566 
 (-0.06) (0.46) 
Present Bias Dummy 12.36*** 12.37***
 (9.83) (9.85) 
Risk aversion parameter 3.051***
 (4.38) 
Loss aversion parameter 4.676***
 (3.30) 
Individual Characteristics  
Age -0.045 0.004 
 (-0.39) (0.04) 
Female -3.123 -2.993 
 (-0.94) (-0.93) 
Schooling -1.095*** -1.026***
 (-2.75) (-2.65) 
Head 7.412** 7.112**
 (2.09) (2.04) 
Constant 38.97*** 106.41*** 89.84*** 63.59**
 (12.77) (3.94) (3.01) (2.10) 
Log Likelihood -11407 -11373 -10523 -10463 
Observations 4160 4160 3864 3864 
Note: 1.The base dummy for agro-climatic zones is the south-western highlands. 2. Robust z-statistics in 
parentheses:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Appendix Table 1:  Payoff Matrix for the Risk Preference Experiment 
 
 Column A Column B EVA-
EVB 
CRRA interval if 
switches to B 
under EUT 
Row Pr 
(p) 
Prize
(M) 
Pr 
(1-p) 
Prize 
(M) 
Pr 
(p)
Prize
(M) 
Pr 
(1-p)
Prize
(M) 
1-1 1.0 4000   0.5 4000 0.5 2000 1000 n/a   
1-2 1.0 4000   0.5 5500 0.5 2000 250 -∞ <σ ≤ -0.62
1-3 1.0 4000   0.5 6000 0.5 2000 0 -0.62 <σ ≤ 0.00
1-4 1.0 4000   0.5 7000 0.5 2000 -500 0.00 <σ ≤ 0.66
1-5 1.0 4000   0.5 8000 0.5 2000 -1000 0.66 <σ ≤ 1.00
1-6 1.0 4000   0.5 8000 0.5 3000 -1500 1.00 <σ ≤ 2.91
1-7 1.0 4000   0.5 8000 0.5 3500 -1750 2.91 <σ ≤ 3.64
1-8 1.0 4000   0.5 8000 0.5 4000 -2000 3.64 <σ ≤ ∞ 
2-1 1.0 4000   0.75 4000 0.25 2000 500 n/a   
2-2 1.0 4000   0.75 4500 0.25 2000 125 -∞ <σ ≤ -0.82
2-3 1.0 4000   0.75 5000 0.25 2000 -250 -0.82 <σ ≤ 0.92
2-4 1.0 4000   0.75 5500 0.25 2000 -625 0.92 <σ ≤ 1.62
2-5 1.0 4000   0.75 6000 0.25 2000 -1000 1.62 <σ ≤ 2.00
2-6 1.0 4000   0.75 7000 0.25 2000 -1750 2.00 <σ ≤ 2.39
2-7 1.0 4000   0.75 7000 0.25 3000 -2000 2.39 <σ ≤ 3.79
2-8 1.0 4000   0.75 7000 0.25 4000 -2250 3.79 <σ ≤ ∞ 
3-1 1.0 4000   0.25 4000 0.75 2000 1500 n/a   
3-2 1.0 4000   0.25 7000 0.75 2000 750 -∞ <σ ≤ -1.15
3-3 1.0 4000   0.25 10000 0.75 2000 0 -1.15 <σ ≤ 0.00
3-4 1.0 4000   0.25 13000 0.75 2000 -750 0.00 <σ ≤ 0.41
3-5 1.0 4000   0.25 16000 0.75 2000 -1500 0.41 <σ ≤ 0.62
3-6 1.0 4000   0.25 16000 0.75 3000 -2250 0.62 <σ ≤ 1.60
3-7 1.0 4000   0.25 16000 0.75 3500 -2625 1.60 <σ ≤ 3.04
3-8 1.0 4000   0.25 16000 0.75 4000 -3000 3.04 <σ ≤ ∞ 
4-1 0.5 6000 0.5 -500 0.5 6000 0.5 -4000 1750    
4-2 0.5 4000 0.5 -500 0.5 6000 0.5 -4000 750    
4-3 0.5 1000 0.5 -500 0.5 6000 0.5 -4000 -750    
4-4 0.5 500 0.5 -500 0.5 6000 0.5 -4000 -1000    
4-5 0.5 500 0.5 -500 0.5 6000 0.5 -3000 -1500    
4-6 0.5 500 0.5 -1000 0.5 6000 0.5 -3000 -1750    
4-7 0.5 500 0.5 -1000 0.5 6000 0.5 -2000 -2250    
4-8 0.5 500 0.5 -1000 0.5 6000 0.5 -1000 -2750    
Note: the table shows all of the prizes/payoffs (M) and the attached probabilities (p,1-p) for choices A and 
B in the four risk games. “EVA-EVB” is the difference in the expected value between lottery A and lottery 
B. The range of sigma σ given in the last column is calculated by equating the expected utilities from 
lottery A and lottery B assuming CRRA utility function (see main text, Section 3.3.2, for the calculation 
method). 
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Appendix Table 2:  Payoff Matrix for the Time Preference Experiment 
 
  Column A Column B Front-end Discount Rate interval if 
switches to B (A for game 6 & 8)Row Month 
(t) 
Prize 
(M) 
Month
(t) 
Prize 
(M) 
Delay 
5-1 0 10,000 2 12,000 no 0 < r ≤ 9.54 
5-2 0 10,000 2 14,000 no 9.54 < r ≤ 18.32 
5-3 0 10,000 2 16,000 no 18.32 < r ≤ 26.49 
5-4 0 10,000 2 18,000 no 26.49 < r ≤ 34.16 
5-5 0 8,000 2 18,000 no 34.16 < r ≤ 50.00 
5-6 0 6,000 2 18,000 no 50.00 < r ≤ 73.21 
5-7 0 4,000 2 18,000 no 73.21 < r ≤ 112.13 
5-8 0 2,000 2 18,000 no 112.13 < r ≤ 200.00 
6-1 6 12,000 4 10,000 yes 0 < r ≤ 9.54 
6-2 6 14,000 4 10,000 yes 9.54 < r ≤ 18.32 
6-3 6 16,000 4 10,000 yes 18.32 < r ≤ 26.49 
6-4 6 18,000 4 10,000 yes 26.49 < r ≤ 34.16 
6-5 6 18,000 4 8,000 yes 34.16 < r ≤ 50.00 
6-6 6 18,000 4 6,000 yes 50.00 < r ≤ 73.21 
6-7 6 18,000 4 4,000 yes 73.21 < r ≤ 112.13 
6-8 6 18,000 4 2,000 yes 112.13 < r ≤ 200.00 
7-1 0 10,000 1 11,000 no 0 < r ≤ 10.00 
7-2 0 10,000 1 12,000 no 10.00 < r ≤ 20.00 
7-3 0 10,000 1 13,000 no 20.00 < r ≤ 30.00 
7-4 0 10,000 1 14,000 no 30.00 < r ≤ 40.00 
7-5 0 9,000 1 14,000 no 40.00 < r ≤ 55.56 
7-6 0 8,000 1 14,000 no 55.56 < r ≤ 75.00 
7-7 0 7,000 1 14,000 no 75.00 < r ≤ 100.00 
7-8 0 5,000 1 14,000 no 100.00 < r ≤ 180.00 
8-1 6 11,000 5 10,000 yes 0 < r ≤ 10.00 
8-2 6 12,000 5 10,000 yes 10.00 < r ≤ 20.00 
8-3 6 13,000 5 10,000 yes 20.00 < r ≤ 30.00 
8-4 6 14,000 5 10,000 yes 30.00 < r ≤ 40.00 
8-5 6 14,000 5 9,000 yes 40.00 < r ≤ 55.56 
8-6 6 14,000 5 8,000 yes 55.56 < r ≤ 75.00 
8-7 6 14,000 5 7,000 yes 75.00 < r ≤ 100.00 
8-8 6 14,000 5 5,000 yes 100.00 < r ≤ 180.00 
Note: the table shows all of the prizes/payoffs (M) and the timing (t) of payment for choices A and B in 
the four time games. The range of discount rate r given in the last column is calculated by equating the 
discounted value from lottery A and lottery B (see main text, Section 3.3.3, for the calculation method). 
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Appendix Table 3:  Respondents with Rational and Irrational Answers  
 Rational Irrational Difference 
 (a) (b) (a)-(b) 
Individual Characteristics mean mean  
Gender (Female=1) 0.32 0.32 0.00 
 (0.47) (0.47)  
Age 44.0 47.9 -3.6*** 
 (14.4) (15.7)  
Schooling 5.90 4.90 1.04*** 
 (3.68) (3.40)  
Head 0.75 0.78 -0.03 
 (0.43) (0.42)  
Household Characteristics    
Household Size 7.65 7.23 0.41 
 (3.84) (2.90)  
Dependency Ratio 1.17 1.13 0.03 
 (0.92) (0.93)  
Value of Assets (US$) 320.7 243.4 77.3 
 (1505.1) (410.1)  
Own Land Size (acre) 7.04 5.24 1.80 
 (21.2) (8.2)  
No. of Observations 1040 237  
 Note: in parenthesis are standard deviations. * indicates significance level at  
 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.   
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Appendix Table 4:  Probability Weighting and Risk Aversion 
 
 Risk Aversion Probability 
Weighting 
 r γ 
   
Agro-climatic Zone1:   
 Bi – Low 0.007 -0.049** 
 (0.93)2 (-2.36) 
 Bi – Medium 0.030*** -0.030 
 (4.81) (-1.44) 
 Bi - High 0.019*** -0.057*** 
 (3.41) (-3.28) 
 Uni – Modal 0.062*** 0.244*** 
 (8.41) (8.80) 
 Eastern Highlands 0.013* -0.074*** 
 (1.78) (-3.67) 
EVA 0.000*** -0.000 
 (11.42) (-0.77) 
Constant 0.391*** 0.983*** 
 (10.72) (11.61) 
   
Observations 24960 24960 
          Note: 1.The base dummy for agro-climatic zones is the south-western highlands.  
2. Robust z-statistics in parentheses:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Appendix Table 5:  Robust Estimation with Controls for Ethnic Groups 
 Risk Aversion Loss Aversion Discount Rate
 (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F)
Village Characteristics   
Agro-climatic Zones1   
 Bi – Low 0.438 0.839*** -0.343 -0.628 -12.32*** -15.27***
 (1.59) (2.67) (-0.79) (-1.31) (-2.65) (-2.62)
 Bi – Medium 0.029 0.408 1.929*** -0.464 6.205 0.185
 (0.11) (1.23) (3.80) (-0.87) (1.18) (0.03)
 Bi – High 0.656***2 1.118*** 0.441 -1.010** 2.254 -2.750
 (3.21) (3.96) (1.17) (-2.28) (0.55) (-0.46)
 Uni – Modal 1.392*** 2.402*** 2.958*** 2.449*** 17.89*** 21.89***
 (4.58) (5.69) (5.08) (3.31) (3.03) (2.39)
 Eastern Highlands 1.009*** 2.301*** 0.549 1.396* 10.78** 17.63*
 (3.89) (5.21) (1.09) (1.81) (1.98) (1.72)
Ethnic Groups3   
  Bantu 0.585** 0.035  -8.449
 (2.09) (0.07)  (-1.52)
  Luo 0.322 1.604*  8.185
 (0.70) (1.79)  (0.70)
  Nilohamitic 0.370 0.883  -0.849
 (1.13) (1.29)  (-0.13)
   
Ethnicity dummies included3 No Yes No Yes No Yes
Village Characteristics included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household Characteristics included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual Characteristics included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
   
Constant 8.875*** 8.434*** 8.569*** 6.050*** 65.86** 83.40***
 (4.89) (4.45) (3.22) (2.36) (2.16) (2.66)
   
Log Likelihood -5737 -5708 -2365 -2245 -10452 -10430
Observations 2898 2898 966 966 3864 3864
 Note: 1.The base dummy for agro-climatic zones is the south-western highlands. 2. Robust z-
statistics in parentheses:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
The base dummy for the ethnic groups is ‘Other’. 3. Ethnic group dummies included are: Acholi, 
Badama, Bafumbira, Baganda, Bagisu, Bakiga, Bakonjo,  
Banyankore, Banyole, Basoga, Batooro, Iteso, Samia, Baruli, Sebei.
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Figure 1: Selected Villages and Agro-Climatic Zones of Study Area in Uganda 
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(Source: Yamano et al., 2004) 
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(Source: Pender et al., 2004) 
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Figure 4: Ethnic Groups of Study Area in Uganda 
 
 
 
(Source: Downloaded from RELIEFWEB, United Nations Office for the  
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Website: http://reliefweb.int)  
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